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Abstract 
This letter is intended to advance an ongoing debate within the Journal of Cleaner Production on the 
appropriate use, and necessity, of two fundamentally different types of accounting method for 
managing social/environmental responsibility, namely, attributional and consequential methods. 
This letter provides a critique of the arguments in Weidema et al. (2019), and analyses the 
presuppositions underpinning Weidema et al.’s position that only consequential methods are 
necessary for managing responsibility. By recognising that managing responsibility involves practices 
such as establishing an initial scope of responsibility and target-setting, in addition to decision-
making, it becomes apparent that both attributional and consequential methods are needed.     
Introduction 
Society requires accounting methods in order to manage its social and environmental 
responsibilities, which involves practices such as establishing an initial scope of responsibility, target-
setting, and decision-making aimed at reducing negative social and environmental burdens. A 
central debate within the life cycle assessment (LCA) literature, which also has direct applicability to 
other forms of environmental accounting, concerns the distinction between ‘attributional’ and 
‘consequential’ methods. Broadly, attributional methods provide inventories of impacts within a 
normatively defined inventory boundary, which are in principle additive, so that the results can be 
summed to approximate total system burdens. In contrast, consequential methods aim to estimate 
the system-wide change in burdens caused by a specified decision. 
In our paper titled ‘Coupling attributional and consequential life cycle assessment: a matter of social 
responsibility’ (Brander et al., 2019) we argue that because attributional and consequential methods 
provide different types of information and fulfil different purposes (i.e. establishing an initial scope 
of responsibility, or informing decisions, respectively), both are necessary for managing 
social/environmental responsibility. This conclusion was partly framed in response to Weidema et 
al.’s (2018) paper ‘Attributional or consequential life cycle assessment: a matter of social 
responsibility’ which argues that a consequential approach is essential, while an attributional 
approach is optional. Weidema et al. replied to our paper with a letter titled ‘Social responsibility is 
always consequential – Rebuttal to Brander, Burritt and Christ’, and the present letter provides an 
analysis and critique of the main arguments in their letter. Continuing this dialogue in the Journal of 
Cleaner Production is intended to provide an open exchange of views, and to advance the debate. 
 
1. Information on total system-level burdens is needed 
Weidema et al. (2019) agree that consequential results cannot be summed to estimate total system-
level burdens, for example global GHG emissions or total water consumption within a water 
catchment area etc., but argue that this information is not necessary for managing 
social/environmental impacts. Instead they suggest that ‘a sustainable state at system level is 
achieved if each and every product provides a net neutral or net positive contribution, a criterion 
that can only be determined by a consequential model’ (2019, p. 12). This argument is problematic 
as sustainability at the system level does not require that ‘each and every product provides a net 
neutral or net positive contribution’, e.g. sustainability at the system level can also be achieved if 
some products create net negative contributions while other products have net positive 
contributions. It is the aggregate system-level impacts that society needs to understand in order to 
know whether sustainable thresholds are exceeded, and, as acknowledged by Weidema et al., 
consequential methods cannot provide that information, whereas as attributional methods can. 
 
2. Consequentialism entails that one is responsible for all the consequences of all one’s 
actions 
An argument against consequentialism within the field of philosophical ethics (presented in Brander 
et al. (2019))  is that consequentialism entails that decision-makers have to consider the 
consequences of all the actions they could possibly undertake, and that this is excessively and 
impractically demanding (Williams, 1995). Weidema et al. (2019) seek to counter this problem by 
quoting the definition of ‘corporate social responsibility’ in ISO 26000:2010, which states that an 
‘organisation does not always have a responsibility to exercise influence purely because it has the 
ability to do so’ (ISO, 2010, sec. 5.2.3). However, following pure consequentialism, this is precisely 
what an organisation has to do, i.e. from a consequential perspective there is no basis for delimiting 
the consequences that one takes responsibility for. The only way to delimit the set of consequences 
is to introduce an additional normative rule, which is exactly what is done in ISO 26000:2010. E.g. 
‘…it [the organisation] cannot be held responsible for the impacts of other organisations over which 
it may have some influence’ (ISO, 2010, sec. 5.2.3) is a normative rule that delimits the 
consequences that an organisation is responsible for. This form of delimitation, which is needed in 
order to avoid the excessive demands of pure consequentialism, is also precisely the function 
provided by attributional inventory boundary-setting, and is one of the reasons that attributional 
methods are necessary. 
 
3. It is not necessary to assume that all product impacts take place at the same point in time 
Although Weidema et al. (2019) accept that attributional methods are additive, i.e. the results can 
be summed to estimate aggregate system-level burdens, they argue that this additivity is only 
hypothetical ‘in the sense that it requires the unrealistic steady-state assumption that all product 
impacts take place at the same point in time’. This statement does not appear to be correct as 
attributional inventories can provide ‘date-stamped’ information for when impacts occur (as 
envisaged with dynamic LCA (e.g. Beloin-Saint-Pierre et al. (2014)), so that it is possible to estimate 
aggregate system-level burdens within any chosen temporal period. Moreover, for some impact 
categories, notably CO2 emissions and climate change, the relevant form of additivity is cumulative, 
i.e. whether cumulative CO2 emissions exceed an established carbon budget, rather than concerning 
aggregate impacts within a specific temporal window. Whether considering burdens within a specific 
temporal period or cumulatively, only attributional methods are appropriate for such purposes. 
 
4. Argument that ‘it is only consequences that one takes responsibility for’ does not entail 
that all methods are consequential 
A final argument in Weidema et al. (2019) suggests that it is always the consequences of human 
actions that are included in environmental accounts, and that this entails that all environmental 
accounts are in some sense consequential. However, this argument conflates the items/values 
within environmental accounts, i.e. environmental burdens caused by human action, with whether 
the accounting method is counting burdens within an inventory boundary or is estimating the 
change in burdens caused by a specified decision, which is the basis of the attributional-
consequential distinction. The conflation of these two things can be illustrated with an example: 
national GHG inventories count anthropogenic GHG emissions, which are the consequence of human 
actions, but such inventories are attributional, i.e. they count emissions within a normatively defined 
boundary and are additive to approximate global emissions. In short, the fact that all environmental 
accounting methods are concerned with measuring anthropogenic environmental impacts (that are 
a consequence of human action) does not entail that all environmental accounting methods are 
consequential methods, nor that only consequential methods are necessary for managing 
responsibility. 
 5. Conclusion 
In order to understand why Weidema et al. (2019) maintain that only consequential methods are 
necessary for managing social/environmental responsibility it is useful to look at the presuppositions 
that underpin that perspective. The key presupposition appears to be that ‘environmental 
assessments are limited to alternative options that have already [been] defined before the 
assessment’ (2019, p. 13), i.e. managing social responsibility is only about decision-making between 
pre-defined options. This perspective overlooks the steps that occur prior to decision-making, i.e. 
establishing an initial scope of responsibility in order to delimit the universe of possible options that 
could be considered, and target-setting within sustainable thresholds, both of which are precisely 
the functions provided by attributional methods (Brander et al., 2019)). Interestingly, Weidema et al. 
(2019) acknowledge that targets ‘play important roles in policy making and management’ (2019, pp. 
12–13), but don’t take the final step of acknowledging that, by implication, the attributional 
accounting methods that underpin target-setting are therefore also necessary. 
One clarification that should be made to the ‘coupled’ accounting approach proposed in Brander et 
al. (2019), which may help to dispel a possible misunderstanding, is that it is not envisaged that 
attributional and consequential methods must be used in tandem every time they are used. Rather, 
what is envisaged is that attributional methods should be used for establishing an initial scope of 
responsibility and for setting targets, and that following that exercise consequential methods should 
be used, on their own, to inform decisions aimed at reducing environmental burdens. Relatedly, it is 
worth emphasising strong agreement with Weidema et al.’s (2019) statement that ‘there is more 
that unite us than divide us’, particularly on the point that consequential methods are necessary for 
decision-making (and that attributional methods are not appropriate for this purpose).   
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